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Abstract: 
Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT) proposes that ideal-self discrepancies predict 
dejection/depression and ought-self discrepancies predict agitation/anxiety, but individual 
differences research has rarely found clear support for this pattern. After considering 
methodological and statistical reasons for these mixed findings, the present research tested 
SDT’s predictions using a multivariate structural equation model with latent predictors and 
outcomes (n = 245 college students). SDT was broadly but incompletely supported: ought 
discrepancies uniquely predicted anxious affect, but both ideal and ought discrepancies predicted 
depressed affect. 
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Article: 
1. Introduction 
The self-concept is intimately tied with emotions, and several self-theories consider how 
emotions relate to discrepancies between the current self-concept and idealized versions of the 
self (Carver and Scheier, 1998, Duval and Silvia, 2001 and Duval and Wicklund, 1972). Self-
Discrepancy Theory (SDT; Higgins, 1987) proposes a model that distinguishes between kinds of 
self-goal discrepancies and kinds of emotions. According to SDT theory, people have three self-
domains: the ideal, ought, and actual selves. The ideal self is a representation of the person 
someone would like to become and includes the ultimate goals for oneself. The ought self is a 
representation of who someone should or ought to become and includes duties and obligations. 
The actual self is who the person currently is. The theory predicts that discrepancies between the 
ideal and actual selves predict dejection (depression-related emotions), and discrepancies 
between the ought and actual selves predict agitation (anxiety-related emotions). 
SDT research has an experimental branch, which manipulates the situational accessibility of 
discrepancies (e.g., Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986), and an individual differences 
branch, which measures natural variation in discrepancies (e.g., Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 
1985). Unlike the experimental literature, the accumulated individual differences literature 
reveals inconsistent support for SDT’s predictions. First, the discriminant validity of ideal and 
ought discrepancies is often suspect (Gonnerman et al., 2000, Heppen and Ogilvie, 2003, Ozgul 
et al., 2003, Phillips and Silvia, 2005, Phillips et al., 2007 and Tangney et al., 1998). Research 
usually finds correlations between ideal and ought discrepancies over .50 and often as high as 
.80; researchers are thus occasionally forced to combine them into a single factor. Second, the 
unique relationships between ideal and ought self-discrepancies and dejection and agitation do 
not typically appear. Many researchers have found that both ideal and ought selves predicted 
both dejection and agitation (Bruch et al., 2000, Gramzow et al., 2000, Ozgul et al., 2003, 
Phillips and Silvia, 2005 and Tangney et al., 1998). 
 
Methodological and statistical issues may be behind these mixed findings. First, many studies 
have had relatively small sample sizes for individual differences work, usually less than 100 
people. Second, most studies included only one measure of self-discrepancies, The Selves 
Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 1985). Although this questionnaire is widely-used, relying on a 
single scale to measure an individual-differences construct makes it difficult to disentangle true 
trait variance from scale-specific method variance. Using different measures and applying latent 
variable models would allow researchers to model trait variance and method variance separately. 
 
Third, the assessment of emotion has often consisted of short, ad hoc scales of unknown validity. 
In six studies (Boldero & Francis, 2000, Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 
1997, Experiments 1 and 2), for example, affect measures included only four items each for 
dejection and agitation. In two experiments (Higgins et al., 1997, Experiments 3 and 4), mood 
measures included only two items each for dejection and agitation. Variations in ad hoc 
measures likely contribute to the variability in support for SDT. Recent researchers have thus 
shifted to using established measures with more evidence for score validity. For example, 
dejected and agitated affect map onto depressive affect and anxious affect, and researchers have 
thus used well-known measures of depression and anxiety to study SDT’s predictions (e.g., 
Bruch et al., 2000). 
 
Finally, the statistical strategy used to test SDT’s predictions is old-fashioned. The early research 
used waves of partial and double-partial correlations. For example, the unique effects of ideals 
on dejection would be tested by partialing oughts from ideals, partialing agitation from dejection, 
and then correlating ideals and dejection (Higgins et al., 1985). This awkward strategy has many 
limitations. In particular, it does not estimate a single simultaneous model that accounts for the 
covariance of the predictors, the covariance of the joint outcomes, and the simultaneous effects 
of the predictors on the outcomes. Multivariate structural regression models are easier to run than 
they were 25 years ago. 
 
In the present research, we sought to provide a stronger test of SDT’s individual differences 
predictions by accounting for some of the measurement, design, and statistical issues that have 
appeared in past work. First, we measured self-discrepancies with three different scales that have 
been used in recent research. This allowed us to model, and thus to separate, trait variance and 
scale-specific variance. Second, we used established scales of depressive and anxious affect, thus 
avoiding ad hoc measures of unknown score validity. And third, we applied multivariate 
structural equation models to simultaneously estimate the model that represents SDT’s 
predictions, thus avoiding the cumbersome process of conducting a series of pairwise partial 
correlations between observed variables. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants and procedure 
A total of 245 undergraduate students—approximately 70% women—at the University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro participated for credit toward a research option. Participants completed a 
battery of questionnaires in groups of 8–50. 
 
2.2. Materials 
2.2.1. Self-discrepancy measures 
People completed three measures of self-discrepancies. The first measure was a version of the 
Selves Questionnaire developed by Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier (1999). For this scale, people 
write adjectives describing the ideal self and the ought self and then rate how discrepant the 
actual self is from the ideal or ought self, using 7-point scales. The second measure was a visual-
analog scale of global discrepancy judgments developed by Heppen & Ogilvie (2003). 
Participants are shown a large circle that represents the ideal self, and they are asked to mark a 
box that represents how close or far they are from it; this is repeated for the ought self. The third 
measure was an adjective-rating scale used by Ozgul et al. (2003; see also Tangney et al. 
(1998)). Participants rated the actual, ideal, and ought selves on a list of 20 adjectives, using 7-
point scales. Discrepancy scores were computed as the averaged differences between ideal and 
ought selves and the actual self. These scales have been used primarily with undergraduate 
samples, so we expected that they would be appropriate for the current sample. 
 
2.2.2. Depression and Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) 
The DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a self-report measure of subjective emotional 
experience developed to discriminate depressive from anxious symptoms. Its depressive 
anhedonia and anxious arousal subscales load onto depression and anxiety factors more cleanly 
than other measures of depressive and anxious affect (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 
1998). We used the 21 item short version, which shows nearly identical psychometric properties 
as the original (Antony et al., 1998, Beuke et al., 2003 and Brown et al., 1997). 
 
2.2.3. Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ) 
The MASQ is a self-report measure of subjective emotional experience designed to assess 
Watson and Clark’s tripartite model of anxiety and depression (Clark and Watson, 1991 and 
Watson et al., 1995). For this study, we included the depressive anhedonia and anxious arousal 
subscales (Keogh and Reidy, 2000 and Reidy and Keogh, 1997), which map onto the constructs 
of dejected and agitated affect posited by SDT (Bruch et al., 2000). 
 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Analytic strategy 
All analyses were conducted with Mplus 5.21. Full-information maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation with robust standard errors was used for all models except for tests of model 
constraints, which used ordinary ML. There were few missing observations: over 93% of the 
participants had no missing scores. All indicators were centered at zero. Reliability for the latent 
variables was estimated via maximal reliability, which yields an H statistic that is analogous to 
Cronbach’s alpha (i.e., varies from 0 to 1) but is more suitable for latent variables ( Drewes, 
2000 and Hancock and Mueller, 2001). Several indicators were formed from averages of items or 
from parcels of items because our sample size was not large enough to allow item-level 
indicators for all the variables. 
 
3.2. Confirmatory factor models 
We first considered confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) of the self-discrepancies and the affect 
variables. For the self-discrepancies, we specified a latent ideal variable and a latent ought 
variable. Each variable had three indicators, one for the rating scale (Carver et al., 1999), the 
visual-analog scale (Heppen & Ogilvie, 2003), and the adjective scale (Ozgul et al., 2003). The 
factor variances were fixed to 1. Because these scales involved different methods, we modeled 
scale-specific variance by allowing the residuals to covary by scale (i.e., a correlated-trait, 
correlated uniqueness kind of multitrait–multimethod model; Brown, 2006). The model fit for 
this CFA was good, χ2(5) = 5.40, p = .37, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .018 (90% CI: .001 to .092), 
SRMR = .022. Construct reliability was higher for ideal (H = .80) than for ought (H = .67), but 
both were acceptable. It is worth noting that constraining the correlation between ideal and ought 
to 1 significantly worsened model fit (p < .0001), indicating that ideal and ought were distinct 
factors despite their high latent correlation (r = .77). 
For the emotions, we specified a latent Depressed Affect variable and a latent Anxious Affect 
variable. The respective depression and anxiety subscales from the DASS and MASQ were split 
into two parcels, yielding four indicators for each latent variable. The path to the first DASS 
indicator was fixed to 1 for each latent variable. The initial fit for this CFA was poor; 
modification indices indicated strong method covariances between the two MASQ depression 
indicators and the two MASQ anxiety indicators. These two residual covariances were thus 
added, which yielded good model fit, χ2(17) = 30.99, p = .02, CFI = .987, RMSEA = .058 (90% 
CI: .023 to .090), SRMR = .043. The latent correlation between Depressed and Anxious Affect 
was r = .65, which is typical (Beuke et al., 2003). Construct reliability was good for both 
Depressed Affect (H = .93) and Anxious Affect (H = .90). 
3.3. Structural models 
To test SDT’s predictions, we estimated a multivariate structural model. Ideal and ought were 
the two predictors; Depressed Affect and Anxious Affect were the two outcomes, and their 
residual covariance was modeled. The effects of ideal and ought on both Depressed and Anxious 
Affect were estimated. Fig. 1depicts the model. SDT predicts specific effects—only the ideal-
depressed and ought-anxious paths ought to be significant. This model fit well, χ
2(66) = 122.79, p < .0001, CFI = .966, RMSEA = .059 (90% CI: .043 to .075), SRMR = .061. 
 
Fig. 1. Effects of self-discrepancies on depressive and anxious affect. 
Regarding Depressed Affect, both ideal (β = .314, p = .043) and ought (β = .302, p = .070) had 
medium effect sizes; together they explained 33.6% of the variance in Depressed Affect. The 
significant effect of ideal is consistent with SDT, which predicts that discrepancies from ideal 
selves should predict dejected affect. The marginal effect of ought, however, is not consistent 
with SDT, which predicts a unique effect of ideal-self discrepancies. 
Regarding Anxious Affect, ideal (β = −.116, p = .461) had a small and non-significant effect, 
but ought (β = .522, p = .004) had a large and significant effect; together they explained 19.2% 
of the variance. This pattern fits SDT’s predictions: discrepancies from ought selves, but not 
from ideal selves, should explain agitated affect. 
In summary, some of SDT’s predictions concerning ideal and ought self-discrepancies were 
supported. First, ideal and ought discrepancies appeared as distinct constructs. This itself is 
notable, given that many studies did not find distinct ideal and ought variables (e.g., Gonnerman 
et al., 2000, Ozgul et al., 2003, Phillips and Silvia, 2005 and Tangney et al., 1998). Estimating 
latent variables from indicators that varied in measurement was thus an effective way to 
disentangle trait and method variance. Second, ideals and oughts did predict their respective 
affects, but these predictions were not unique in the manner predicted by SDT. Ideals predicted 
depressive affect, and oughts predicted Anxious Affect, but oughts also predicted depressive 
affect. Self-discrepancies thus predicted affective experience, but their effects were more diffuse 
than predicted by the theory. 
 
References  
M.M. Antony, P.J. Bieling, B.J. Cox, M.W. Enns, R.P. Swinson. Psychometric properties of the 
42-item and 21-item versions of the depression anxiety stress scales in clinical groups and a 
community sample. Psychological Assessment, 10 (1998), pp. 176–181  
C.J. Beuke, R. Fischer, J. McDowall. Anxiety and depression: Why and how to measure their 
separate effects. Clinical Psychology Review, 23 (2003), pp. 831–848  
J. Boldero, J. Francis. The relation between self-discrepancies and emotion: The moderating 
roles of self-guide importance, location relevance, and social self-domain centrality. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 78 (2000), pp. 38–52  
T.A. Brown. Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research. Guilford, New York (2006)  
T.A. Brown, B.F. Chorpita, W. Korotitsch, D.H. Barlow. Psychometric properties of the 
depression anxiety stress scales (DASS) in clinical samples. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
35 (1997), pp. 79–89  
M.A. Bruch, K.M. Rivet, H.J. Laurenti. Type of self-discrepancy and relationships to 
components of the tripartite model of emotional distress. Personality and Individual Differences, 
29 (2000), pp. 37–44  
C.S. Carver, J.W. Lawrence, M.F. Scheier. Self-discrepancies and affect: Incorporating the role 
of feared selves. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25 (1999), pp. 783–792  
C.S. Carver, M.F. Scheier. On the self-regulation of behavior. Cambridge University Press, New 
York (1998)  
L.A. Clark, D. Watson. Tripartite model of anxiety and depression: Psychometric evidence and 
taxonomic implications. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100 (1991), pp. 316–336  
D.W. Drewes. Beyond the Spearman-Brown: A structural approach to maximal reliability. 
Psychological Methods, 5 (2000), pp. 214–227  
T.S. Duval, P.J. Silvia. Self-awareness and causal attribution: A dual systems theory. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Boston (2001)  
T.S. Duval, R.A. Wicklund. A theory of objective self-awareness. Academic Press, New York 
(1972)  
M.E. Gonnerman, C.P. Parker, H. Lavine, J. Huff. The relationship between self-discrepancies 
and affective states: The moderating roles of self-monitoring and standpoints on the self. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26 (2000), pp. 810–819  
R.H. Gramzow, C. Sedikides, A.T. Panter, C.A. Insko. Aspects of self-regulation and self-
structure as predictors of perceived emotional distress. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 26 (2000), pp. 188–205  
G.R. Hancock, R.O. Mueller. Rethinking construct reliability within latent variable systems. R. 
Cudeck, S. du Toit, D. Sörbom (Eds.), Structural equation modeling: Present and future, 
Scientific Software International, Lincolnwood, IL (2001), pp. 195–216  
J.B. Heppen, D.M. Ogilvie. Predicting affect from global self-discrepancies: The dual role of the 
undesired self. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 22 (2003), pp. 347–368  
E.T. Higgins. Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological Review, 94 
(1987), pp. 319–340  
E.T. Higgins, R.N. Bond, R. Klein, T. Strauman. Self-discrepancies and emotional vulnerability: 
How magnitude, accessibility, and type of discrepancy influence affect. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 51 (1986), pp. 5–15  
E.T. Higgins, R. Klein, T. Strauman. Self-concept discrepancy theory: A psychological model 
for distinguishing among different aspects of depression and anxiety. Social Cognition, 3 (1985), 
pp. 51–76  
E.T. Higgins, J. Shah, R. Friedman. Emotional responses to goal attainment: Strength of 
regulatory focus as a moderator. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72 (1997), pp. 
515–525  
E. Keogh, J. Reidy. Exploring the factor structure of the mood and anxiety symptom 
questionnaire (MASQ). Journal of Personality Assessment, 74 (2000), pp. 106–125  
P.F. Lovibond, S.H. Lovibond. The structure of negative emotional states: Comparison of the 
depression anxiety stress scales (DASS) with the beck depression and anxiety inventories. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33 (1995), pp. 335–342  
S. Ozgul, B. Heubeck, J. Ward, R. Wilkinson. Self-discrepancies: Measurement and relation to 
various affective states. Australian Journal of Psychology, 55 (2003), pp. 56–62  
A.G. Phillips, P.J. Silvia. Self-awareness and the emotional consequences of self-discrepancies. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31 (2005), pp. 703–713  
A.G. Phillips, P.J. Silvia, M.J. Paradise. The undesired self and emotional experience. A latent 
variable analysis. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 26 (2007), pp. 1035–1047  
J. Reidy, E. Keogh. Testing the discriminant and convergent validity of the mood and anxiety 
symptoms questionnaire using a British sample. Personality and Individual Differences, 23 
(1997), pp. 337–344  
J.P. Tangney, P.M. Niedenthal, M.V. Covert, D.H. Barlow. Are shame and guilt related to 
distinct self-discrepancies: A test of Higgins’s (1987) hypotheses. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 75 (1998), pp. 257–268  
D. Watson, K. Weber, J.A. Assenheimer, L.A. Clark, M.E. Strauss, R.A. McCormick. Testing a 
tripartite model: I. Evaluating the convergent and discriminant validity of anxiety and depression 
symptom scales. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104 (1995), pp. 3–14 
